Bratia PutinShenkove (Brothers Puti-Shenko)

There are indeed some striking family resemblances. Both have irascible authoritarian presidents—Russia's Vladimir Putin and Belarus's brutal Alyaksandr Lukashenko—and both are inclined to risky diplomatic brinkmanship. This week that similarity propelled them over the brink and into an unfraternal trade dispute. Brief though it may have been, it had important implications for Russia's energy dealings with Europe, and perhaps also for the future of benighted Belarus. Like in Bothers Karamazov (Bratia Karamazove, in Russian) similarities are not so close.

It is all clear in the blog by Dmitry Babich. He explains several false ideas about Belaurs and Russia.

Stereotype number one: Lukashenko’s regime strives to reestablish some form of the old Soviet Union by merging Belarus with Russia.

Lukashenko went out of his way to assert the opposite. “Sovereignty and independence are sacred words; in fact, they are as sacred as some dogmas of Christianity,” Lukashenko said on Jan. 7 after a church service on Orthodox Easter. “I never said we should make Belarus a part of some other state. I just always supported the idea of a union of states, especially the ones where our brothers live.” This “union of states,” however, is not the old Soviet Union, but a strange economic centaur, where the bigger reformed partner (Russia) subsidizes the economy of a smaller unreformed one (Belarus). Thanks to the cheap energy from Russia, the old-fashioned Soviet plants in Belarus could continue operating and their workers could continue getting their salaries. The Soviet Union was partially recreated, but on a smaller scale, in a single small country named Belarus.

Stereotype number two: The Belarussian regime is dependent on Russia; it abhors Belarussian patriotism and gears its policy to Moscow.

Again, this is not completely true. Russia is often criticized on Belarussian state-controlled mass media as a “traitor” to the old Soviet (or, in modern newspeak, Slavic) cause. The media even summons up the notion of “good people – bad czar,” so familiar to Western readers. However, if the Western media preaches about “Putin’s backsliding on democracy,” Belarusian state-owned television lectures on “Russia ruled by oligarchs and corrupt politicians,” who prevent it from “backsliding on democracy” completely and becoming a true heir of the Soviet Union, as Belarus has already done.

Stereotype number three: the Belarusian regime’s power is based solely on fear, it has no public support either in Belarus or Russia. Meanwhile, Putin’s regime is “bullying” its neighbors and disregarding public opinion.

In reality, both Lukashenko’s regime and Putin’s tough new policy towards the former Soviet countries are based on certain sentiments shared by Russian and Belarusian public opinion. One of them, which Lukashenko used often during his reign, is the nostalgia for the Soviet Union. The other was best summarized by Valery Fyodorov, the director of VTsIOM, a Moscow-based think tank specializing in public opinion studies. “One section of Russians prefers isolationism, while the other one is nostalgic about the Soviet Union, despite the utter impossibility of the latter’s recreation,” Fyodorov wrote in his article for the book Integration in Eurasia. “There is a certain mistaken dualism here: either give us back the USSR in its entirety or we don’t need any integration at all, especially if it requires a payment.”While Lukashenko promises a return of the USSR in a country of 10 million people, Putin accuses Lukashenko of sabotaging a union state and imposes added payments on gas and other Russian resources. Both enjoy the support of large sections of their respective constituencies.

The two countries' tactics may be similar, but their muscle is not. Mr Putin talked of cutting oil production and rerouting supplies. The Russians also threatened duties on all Belarusian goods, many of which would struggle to find markets elsewhere. On January 10th, after the presidents talked on the telephone, Mr Lukashenko blinked; the transit fee was lifted; and oil began to flow again before Europe was seriously affected. Nevertheless, the short but nasty spat has telling lessons.

The most important lesson for Europe, however, is once again that over-reliance on Russian energy is dangerous, writes The Economist.